Jun
23
2010
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editor
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How long can chavismo continue to ride the wave of its own mythology

This blog entry was first published by vheadline.com, and its author explains how Polar is a staple in Venezuela´s family lives.

In another inversion of leftist determinism, an attempt by Chavez’ embattled administration to expropriate Venezuela’s largest remaining private company was thwarted earlier this month, in part due to organised opposition by employees looking to protect both their jobs and their hard-won working conditions.
Empresas Polar is as central to Venezuelan capitalism as Coca Cola or Ford are to the American version. Its principal product is Polar Light, a tastelessly diluted beer — served ice cold, much to the delight of the overheated Venezuelan — but they also make Maltin (a fizzy malt drink which is possibly the nation’s favorite soft drink) and Harina Pan (maize flour, from which the staple foods of the arepa and empanada are made), amongst other things. Their products are to be found in every Venezuelan home, and are consumed on a daily basis by pretty much every single Venezuelan. Moreover, the bizarre logo (a polar bear on an ice cap, somewhat incongruous in the Caribbean tropics) also benefits from a visual ubiquity — on t-shirts, at sporting events and advertising billboards — that is matched only by the various red logos of chavismo. Add on the fact that one of Polar’s biggest clients is Mercal, the state-subsidized food market, and the mutual hostility between the nation’s two most powerful bosses suddenly becomes somewhat inevitable.
In the last few months, in the now familiar fashion of the chavista administration, moves were made to prepare for a state seizure of the assets of Venezuela’s largest remaining private company. In April, a warehouse was closed down by the military in Barquisimeto, Lara state, with all the products being seized to be distributed by PDVAL — a state programme in which petrol dollars are used to distribute foodstuffs and basic goods throughout the country. Chavez accused the company of hoarding its products in order to enforce shortages and price inflation, while Polar replied that it had found its business operations compromised and undermined by the electricity crisis (industry has been subject to strict power rationing, with many being fined for “over-consumption”). The raid brought a sense of deja vu to those who remembered the anti-chavista business lockout of 2003, in which a Polar warehouse was amongst those seized by the government.
After the Barquisimeto raid came the verbal threats, with Chavez warning Lorenzo Mendoza, Polar’s multimillionaire owner, “don’t provoke me … stay quiet and don’t get mad,” on live TV, before claiming he “wasn’t afraid” to nationalise the company. Venezuelans — who had already seen a series of supermarkets nationalised this year under the same rubric — prepared to watch another company change name and…well, little else really.
However, the Polar workers had done their maths. As a result of the seizure in Lara, 450 workers had lost their jobs, and justifiably, the rest of the 30,000-strong Polar workforce was similarly perturbed. Even those who wouldn’t lose their jobs following nationalization had cause for concern as to the recognition of their collective contracts and right to union affiliation (after all, as one chavista infamously said in defense of firing union activists in a state-run factory, “under socialism, there are no unions”). A long tradition of workplace struggle within Polar factories had granted workers “the best benefits in the country,” in the words of one worker in El Tigre, Anzoategui state, and it looked likely the cash-strapped state would slash their gains, prioritising shoring up the near-nonfunctional PDVAl (more on that later).
As government inspectors suddenly started to perform all manner of spot checks on Polar factories and warehouses, searching for a legal pretext with which to execute seizure, demonstrations were organized by workers, and most major towns saw ‘caravanas’ (motorised processions of tooting horns) of Polar workers in their private cars. Their slogan was “SI SE PUEDE,” an audacious challenge to the government’s strength. In the end, on 12 June, the Polar workers were proved right, as the government was forced to retreat, suddenly calling reports of a planned government expropriation of Polar “totally false and irresponsible … a right wing tactic,” etc, etc and confirming that it would not happen after all.
Of course, the workers’ protests were not the sole cause of the government’s capitulation. Simultaneous to the workers’ protests — and a considerable level of public outcry over the Polar question — the state had become wrapped up in yet another crisis that ultimately proved to be fatal for their plans. Having spent much of 2010 raging against the hoarding of foodstuffs that should be in people’s homes, it suddenly emerged that — with figures being constantly revised upwards to account for reports emerging from all corners of the Bolivarian Republic — over 120,000 tonnes of products have gone rotten and been disposed of while under PDVAL supervision in the last month alone. In a country with widespread shortages which PDVAL is supposed to combat, if that food had been delivered onto plates, it is estimated that in the same time period, it would have fed more than 17 million people (out of a national population of 26 million)!
The hypocrisy of Chavez’ crusade against the wastefulness of private Venezuelan industry — his carrot for the stick of Polar’s nationalization — was laid bare for all to see, and another defeat was inflicted on the beleaguered chavista regime.
So what next then, now that the Polar workers’ contracts are safe — for the time being, at least? Well, even though they’re in a better position under Polar than under the state, that’s no reflection on the generous character of the elitist Mendoza. Throughout the expropriation saga (or “soap,” as one commentator called it), a group of former Polar employees have been demonstrating, demanding payment of the much-vaunted benefits. Indeed, at one point, the government attempted to piggyback on the struggles of Polar workers against their company as an argument for nationalization, to no avail.
The culture of workers’ struggle — regardless of the color of their boss’ shirt, or the logo it carries — will have to continue in order to maintain their conditions.
Moreover, the endemic inefficiency of PDVAL — in a time of chronic food shortages and an almost unpredecedently grave economic crisis — has been proven, once and for all.
A system in which some 70% of foodstuffs are imported (largely thanks to the collapse of the national agricultural economy), only for 70% of it to be rendered inedible, cannot claim to have the people’s best interests at heart.

In another inversion of leftist determinism, an attempt by Chavez’ embattled administration to expropriate Venezuela’s largest remaining private company was thwarted earlier this month, in part due to organised opposition by employees looking to protect both their jobs and their hard-won working conditions.

Empresas Polar is as central to Venezuelan capitalism as Coca Cola or Ford are to the American version. Its principal product is Polar Light, a tastelessly diluted beer — served ice cold, much to the delight of the overheated Venezuelan — but they also make Maltin (a fizzy malt drink which is possibly the nation’s favorite soft drink) and Harina Pan (maize flour, from which the staple foods of the arepa and empanada are made), amongst other things. Their products are to be found in every Venezuelan home, and are consumed on a daily basis by pretty much every single Venezuelan. Moreover, the bizarre logo (a polar bear on an ice cap, somewhat incongruous in the Caribbean tropics) also benefits from a visual ubiquity — on t-shirts, at sporting events and advertising billboards — that is matched only by the various red logos of chavismo. Add on the fact that one of Polar’s biggest clients is Mercal, the state-subsidized food market, and the mutual hostility between the nation’s two most powerful bosses suddenly becomes somewhat inevitable.

In the last few months, in the now familiar fashion of the chavista administration, moves were made to prepare for a state seizure of the assets of Venezuela’s largest remaining private company. In April, a warehouse was closed down by the military in Barquisimeto, Lara state, with all the products being seized to be distributed by PDVAL — a state programme in which petrol dollars are used to distribute foodstuffs and basic goods throughout the country. Chavez accused the company of hoarding its products in order to enforce shortages and price inflation, while Polar replied that it had found its business operations compromised and undermined by the electricity crisis (industry has been subject to strict power rationing, with many being fined for “over-consumption”). The raid brought a sense of deja vu to those who remembered the anti-chavista business lockout of 2003, in which a Polar warehouse was amongst those seized by the government.

After the Barquisimeto raid came the verbal threats, with Chavez warning Lorenzo Mendoza, Polar’s multimillionaire owner, “don’t provoke me … stay quiet and don’t get mad,” on live TV, before claiming he “wasn’t afraid” to nationalise the company. Venezuelans — who had already seen a series of supermarkets nationalised this year under the same rubric — prepared to watch another company change name and…well, little else really.

However, the Polar workers had done their maths. As a result of the seizure in Lara, 450 workers had lost their jobs, and justifiably, the rest of the 30,000-strong Polar workforce was similarly perturbed. Even those who wouldn’t lose their jobs following nationalization had cause for concern as to the recognition of their collective contracts and right to union affiliation (after all, as one chavista infamously said in defense of firing union activists in a state-run factory, “under socialism, there are no unions”). A long tradition of workplace struggle within Polar factories had granted workers “the best benefits in the country,” in the words of one worker in El Tigre, Anzoategui state, and it looked likely the cash-strapped state would slash their gains, prioritising shoring up the near-nonfunctional PDVAl (more on that later).

As government inspectors suddenly started to perform all manner of spot checks on Polar factories and warehouses, searching for a legal pretext with which to execute seizure, demonstrations were organized by workers, and most major towns saw ‘caravanas’ (motorised processions of tooting horns) of Polar workers in their private cars. Their slogan was “SI SE PUEDE,” an audacious challenge to the government’s strength. In the end, on 12 June, the Polar workers were proved right, as the government was forced to retreat, suddenly calling reports of a planned government expropriation of Polar “totally false and irresponsible … a right wing tactic,” etc, etc and confirming that it would not happen after all.

Of course, the workers’ protests were not the sole cause of the government’s capitulation. Simultaneous to the workers’ protests — and a considerable level of public outcry over the Polar question — the state had become wrapped up in yet another crisis that ultimately proved to be fatal for their plans. Having spent much of 2010 raging against the hoarding of foodstuffs that should be in people’s homes, it suddenly emerged that — with figures being constantly revised upwards to account for reports emerging from all corners of the Bolivarian Republic — over 120,000 tonnes of products have gone rotten and been disposed of while under PDVAL supervision in the last month alone. In a country with widespread shortages which PDVAL is supposed to combat, if that food had been delivered onto plates, it is estimated that in the same time period, it would have fed more than 17 million people (out of a national population of 26 million)!

The hypocrisy of Chavez’ crusade against the wastefulness of private Venezuelan industry — his carrot for the stick of Polar’s nationalization — was laid bare for all to see, and another defeat was inflicted on the beleaguered chavista regime.

So what next then, now that the Polar workers’ contracts are safe — for the time being, at least? Well, even though they’re in a better position under Polar than under the state, that’s no reflection on the generous character of the elitist Mendoza. Throughout the expropriation saga (or “soap,” as one commentator called it), a group of former Polar employees have been demonstrating, demanding payment of the much-vaunted benefits. Indeed, at one point, the government attempted to piggyback on the struggles of Polar workers against their company as an argument for nationalization, to no avail.

The culture of workers’ struggle — regardless of the color of their boss’ shirt, or the logo it carries — will have to continue in order to maintain their conditions. Moreover, the endemic inefficiency of PDVAL — in a time of chronic food shortages and an almost unpredecedently grave economic crisis — has been proven, once and for all.

A system in which some 70% of foodstuffs are imported (largely thanks to the collapse of the national agricultural economy), only for 70% of it to be rendered inedible, cannot claim to have the people’s best interests at heart.

 
Jun
22
2010
Posted by
editor
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Algo huele a podrido en Venezuela

Article published by El País, available only in Spanish.

“Hedía como 100 perros muertos”, dice Dayana Reyes, segura de que no ha exagerado lo suficiente. El olor que llegaba a su casa desde Puerto Cabello, era el de miles de toneladas de carne podrida. Este año, en el Estado de Carabobo, donde se halla el segundo puerto más grande de Venezuela, han sido localizadas 103.802 toneladas de alimentos putrefactos que el Gobierno de Hugo Chávez ha importado y abandonado dentro de contenedores en muelles y almacenes. Son millones de kilos de comida que debían ser vendidos a bajo precio en la red de mercados socialistas del Estado.

Los vecinos de la parroquia de La Fraternidad, que tienen por horizonte montañas de contenedores que sobresalen tras los muros del puerto, fueron los primeros en olerse que había algo podrido en las importaciones oficiales. En abril de 2009, les informaron de que el aroma provenía de 50 contenedores con alimentos de la Productora y Distribuidora Venezolana de Alimentos (Pdval), filial de la estatal Petróleos de Venezuela (Pdvsa). Pero la noticia no se convirtió en escándalo nacional hasta hace pocas semanas, cuando comenzaron a aparecer cientos de lotes de contenedores cargados de comida descompuesta. Y el pasado día 15 el Gobierno de la República Dominicana devolvió a Venezuela un barco cargado con 60 contenedores con latas de atún, leche y pasta caducadas, que habían sido enviados por el Gobierno de Chávez como ayuda humanitaria para Haití.

El asunto es grave, ha dicho el presidente-comandante, pero no demasiado representativo. “Estas toneladas son bastantes. No quiero minimizar en nada su gravedad, pero no representan ni el 1% del inmenso caudal de alimentos que ahora sí les llega a ustedes [al pueblo] gracias a Mercal y gracias a Pdval”, dijo Chávez el pasado día 3, cuando salió en defensa del presidente de Pdvsa y ministro de Energía, Rafael Ramírez. Para Chávez, “la oligarquía” ha inflado el caso para desprestigiar la “lucha por la soberanía alimentaria del pueblo”.

Desde hace siete años, Chávez intenta hacerse cargo de la producción, distribución y comercialización de alimentos para resguardarse del “sabotaje” del sector privado. En 2003, comenzó por crear la empresa Mercados de Alimentos (Mercal), que instaló puestos de venta callejeros de comida a bajo coste por todo el país. En enero de 2008, Chávez ordenó a la gerencia de Pdvsa que garantizara la “soberanía alimentaria” del país y creó Pdval, para que se encargara de todo el proceso, desde las compras en el extranjero hasta la venta en los mercados socialistas. Más del 70% de los alimentos que se consumen en Venezuela son importados y el Gobierno hace buena parte de estas compras en Estados Unidos, Brasil, Argentina, Uruguay y Ecuador. El régimen reconoce tímidamente ahora que debió encargar la misión al Ministerio de Alimentación y no a una empresa petrolera.

Parte de la responsabilidad le corresponde también a la gestión de los puertos, que fueron nacionalizados en 2009 y puestos bajo control de la Empresa Bolivariana de Puertos, con 51% de capital venezolano y 49%, cubano. Trabajadores de los muelles, que han pedido no ser identificados por temor a ser despedidos, afirman que Puerto Cabello solo funciona a media máquina desde que fue nacionalizado. “Por pura burocracia, la mercancía tarda entre uno y tres meses en salir del puerto”, dice uno de ellos. En el retraso hay además un gran negocio: el alquiler de cada contenedor le cuesta al Estado unos 150 dólares (120 euros) al día. Pero los contenedores refrigerados que transportan pollo y carne requieren de electricidad, y durante dos horas al día se quedaban sin energía, expuestos al sol, a causa del plan de racionamiento del suministro que se aplicó hasta hace un par de semanas en Venezuela.

El Gobierno afirma que todo es culpa de “los ricachones”, de las empresas privadas, y les responsabiliza de que el país atraviese desde hace tres años periodos de desabastecimiento o escasez de harina, leche, carne, pollo, mantequilla y arroz, así como de que la inflación acumulada en lo que va año sea ya de 14,2%. En los últimos dos años, el régimen ha expropiado o intervenido 76 empresas vinculadas al sector de la alimentación. Entre las afectadas se cuentan grandes compañías de venta de cereales, café y tomate, como Molinos Nacionales, Cargill y Heinz, y cadenas de hipermercados, como las franco-colombianas Éxito y Cada.

La empresa venezolana más grande del sector, Alimentos Polar, es la siguiente en el punto de mira de Chávez. El presidente-comandante acusa a sus directivos de acaparar alimentos y de encabezar la huelga que paralizó el país entre diciembre de 2003 y febrero de 2004. “[Lorenzo] Mendoza si tú crees que no soy capaz de nacionalizar Polar, no te equivoques, porque te tengo ahí”, retó Chávez al dueño de la compañía el pasado día 3. Las empresas del grupo Polar fueron fundadas hace 70 años, emplean a unos 30.000 trabajadores y cuentan con 30 plantas industriales y más de 150.000 puntos de ventas, según datos de la compañía. En marzo, el Gobierno expropió algunas de sus propiedades en la ciudad de Barquisimeto, en el centro del país. Dos meses más tarde, la Guardia Nacional decomisó 120 toneladas de alimentos de los depósitos de Polar. De inmediato Chávez pidió a la fiscalía que abriera un procedimiento contra la empresa por el delito de “acaparamiento” y por jugar con el hambre del pueblo.

 
Jun
15
2010
Posted by
editor
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The VeneCuba saga continues…

Photo Credits: Google Images

In a rare public critique, a former aide to Mr. Chávez has lambasted the role of Cuban advisers in delicate areas that he says include military intelligence, weapons training, strategic planning and the logistics of Mr. Chávez himself, who often travels on a Cuban plane.

“We are at the mercy of meddling in areas of national security by a Cuban regime, which wants Chávez to remain in power because Chávez gives them oil,” the former aide, Antonio Rivero, a brigadier general who retired this year, said in an interview.

“The Cuban advisers are there to exert pressure,” he added, “and they often claim to speak on the president’s behalf as if they were his emissaries.”

Mr. Chávez has made no bones about the presence of Cuban military advisers, who he says are “modestly” helping in some areas. But he has publicly offered no details on how many there are or where they are working.

Carlos A. Romero, a political scientist at the Central University of Venezuela who researches military ties with Cuba, estimates that there are 500 Cuban military advisers in the country, including an elite group of about 20 officers operating from Fuerte Tiuna, the country’s main garrison.

According to a New York Times article published this week, the critique by General Rivero, who worked as an aide to Mr. Chávez early in his presidency and later as the head of the emergency management agency, comes after years in which Cuba has served as a linchpin of support for Mr. Chávez