This blog entry was originally posted by the Financial Times.
The faceless capitalists of Wall Street have long considered Venezuela a “sell” – the oil producing country’s foreign currency bonds are considered almost twice as risky as Greece’s. But might even Cuba’s revolutionary gerontocracy now believe the same?
For those who like to look at the world through the lens of financial conspiracies, that’s one tentative reading of why Cuba pledged last week to release 52 political prisoners. Yes, the issue was attracting unwelcome international attention. But it is also true that throughout its history, Cuba has been a master at playing its geo-strategic cards. The US and the USSR used to play the role of sugar daddy to the country before. Lately it’s been President Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela. But Venezuela’s economy, like Cuba’s, is now in a mess.
Any move that suggests Cuba wants to improve ties with the US – and freeing political prisoners is one step that could ease the US travel ban and, ultimately, the embargo – therefore represents a hedging of Cuba’s geo-strategic bets. Looked at another way, it is also a tacit recognition by Havana that Caracas, despite its similar ideological outlook and oil wealth, might now be, in traders’ parlance, an “underperform”.
The list of reasons of why Cuba – or Wall Street – might think so is long and growing. Venezuela this year tightened capital controls as it no longer has sufficient reserves to sustain the capital flight of the last year. Oil sector output – according to independent estimates – has fallen considerably over the past decade due to a lack of investment. And the country also faces a large and rising contingent liability in the form of unpaid compensation owed to private business that have been nationalised by Mr Chávez.
There are currently 11 lawsuits and arbitration claims totalling $43.5bn lodged with the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement on Investment Disputes. The bulk of this relates to a $10bn claim by ExxonMobil and a $30bn claim by ConocoPhillips. Looked at another way, according to local consulting firm Ecoanalitica, Mr Chavez has announced nationalizations of some $23bn since 2006, and of that amount, the authorities have paid almost $9bn, leaving $14bn owing.
Lately, brokers only tend to recommend buying Venezuelan bonds on the basis of how long they need to hold them and not lose money. (About 4 years, assuming current 15 per cent yields and a recovery rate of 30 cents on the dollar.) With the largest oil reserves outside the Middle East, and a relatively comfortable foreign reserves position, Venezuela certainly can pay, should it wish to. The question for investors in a country where the government calls its private brokers a “tumor” is: how long will it? The Castro brothers may have given a clue.